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ABSTRACT 
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines a market where buyers cannot judge A large fraction of economic activity is organized on the 
the quality of the good they receive until after they consume it . 
Even then , they may make mistakes in their judgments. The paper 
derives the equilibrium quality distribution for goods produced and 
the equilibrium distribution of firms by the quality of good they 
produce , and identifies the specific factors which produce a reputation 
effect. Comparative statics allow analysis of the effects of 
restrictions on information flow and barriers to entry. 
basis of contracts which are either legally unenforceable or at least 
unenforceable in practice. As the actions of parties to some joint 
economic activity become more complex or difficult for third parties 
to verify, two costs of contracting begin to grow larger. First, the 
enforcement and litigation costs begin to grow. Second, the transactions 
costs of drafting a contract which adequately describes the contemplated 
actions grow larger. The first cost tends to produce the situation that 
even if a contract is legally enforceable, it is in practice non-
enforceable because the size of litigation and enforcement costs 
relative to the gains from performance make the option of legal 
enforcement unattractive . The second cost tends to produce the 
situation that actions are not adequately specified to be legally 
enforceable . In both situations, parties to a contract find themselves 
in the position where they need not fear legal sanctions for breaching 
a contractual obligation, yet they often do honor these obligations 
even when their apparent interests lie in breaching .  
*This paper was written while I was supported by a Canada Council 
Doctoral Fellowship. I would like to thank Robert Bates , Ed Green , 
Roger Noll , Alan Schwartz, and Louis Wilde for helpful discussions. 
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Economists have traditionally rationalized such behavior 
in the context of a world of self-interested actors by reference to 
"reputation . "  Economic actors operating on the basis of self-interest 
may well honor non binding contracts that appear not to be in 
their short run interest if future opportunities depend on 
adequate performance of current obligations. In this case contracts 
merely provide parties with a mutual basis for understanding what 
their obligations to one another are. A growing literature is 
examining the micro-foundations of such behavior from a repeated 
games standpoint (Green, 1980; Radner, 1979; Rubinstein ,  1979; 
Townsend, 1979). Less attention, however , has been paid to the other 
perspective from which economists typically analyze a problem -­
behavior of markets as a whole . 
This paper models behavior of a market where product 
quality can vary and consumers cannot determine this quality prior 
to purchase.  The "contract" being considered is the firm's 
promise to supply a high quality good. Ackerlof (i970) was one of 
the first to consider.such a market. He pointed out that if firms 
could not be differentiated by consumers and if consumers did not 
believe that a f inn would continue to produce at its past quality 
level, then firms would all produce the lowest quality of goods. 
A market of "lemons" would result. The starting point of this paper 
is the assumption that a firm can build a reputation -- firms.can be 
differentiated by consumers and consumers believe that the quality of 
a firm's performance in the future will be related to its performance 
in the past. This situation has been extensively analyzed (Klein and 
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Leffler 1979; Dybvig and Spatt 1980) under the assumption that consumers 
can judge quality with complete accuracy once they have received the 
good. Under this assumption ,  firms which misrepresent quality have a 
lifetime of one period. These papers are thus in a sense on the 
economics of "fly by night operators. "
A very large class of goods does not.satisfy this assumption 
of perfect consumer accuracy. In particular, consumers are often 
capable of performing only very partial and vague evaluations of the 
quality of professional services they receive from doctors , lawyers, 
banks, mechanics , opticians, etc. Furthermore , the quality of a 
service from a given professional may vary from time to time. This 
combination of observer error and actual quality variance makes it 
difficult for consumers to correctly evaluate the quality of service 
that a firm produces. In such a market a producer can contemplate 
staying in the market over the long run even if he misrepresents the 
quality of his product. The quality elasticity of demand is no 
longer infinite, but a finite positive number. The quality elasticity 
of demand is larger to the extent that reputation functions in the 
market . Reputation means two things. A higher quality firm is more 
likely to experience repeat sales from its current customers. A 
higher quality firm is also more likely to receive new customers from 
the pool of customers dissatisfied with their current firm. Both 
factors mean that a higher quality firm will in the long run have a 
larger number of customers than a low quality firm. 
A key characteristic of most of the professions in the 
service sector is that they tend to severely limit information flow 
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to the consumers they service . An insightful study of this phenomenon 
describes it as follows. 
Professions in the service sector exercise extensive 
control over . the type and amount of information 
publicly disseminated about these services. Profes­
sional codes of ethics usually prohibit advertising, 
limit brand name identification, strongly discourage 
public evaluation of other professionals' work, and 
place limitations wherever possible on other public 
indications of the characteristics, quality, or price 
of the services provided." (Benham and Benham, 1975.) 
It is therefore important to know how such limitations on information 
flow might affect such markets . The analysis of this paper suggests 
that one effect of this limitation of information is to reduce the quality 
elasticity of demand. This in turn reduces the number of high quality 
firms and the number of consumers patronizing them. Three factors 
contribute to this result . 
First, as people become better judges of the quality of 
services they receive, the quit rate of low quality firms relative 
to high quality firms becomes larger . That is, dissatisfied customers 
are more often justifiably dissatisfied . Second, customers searching 
for a new firm are more likely to choose a high quality firm as 
information in the market increases . Third, as information and 
consumer sophistication decrease, consumers become less able to 
supply one another with detailed descriptions of the quality of 
the firms they patronize. Word-of-mouhh advertising becomes based more 
and more on simple positive or negative recommendations. In such a 
situation an externality is associated with the consumer's choice of a 
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rule when to quit his current firm . His choice of rule affects other 
consumers through their reliance on his recommendation. The individually 
rational decision of how harsh a judge to be does not take this extra 
marginal benefit into account and consequently the consumer is a less 
harsh judge of his current firm than is socially optimal. This translates 
into a lower than optimal quality elasticity of demand. 
The reward to producing high quality goods is more customers.  
The reward to producing low quality goods is lower costs and thus 
a higher profit per good. This latter factor becomes less important 
as market price rises above the average variable cost of producing 
high quality goods because the relative cost savings to producing 
low quality goods becomes smaller . In a zero profits entry equilibrium 
price rises above average variable cost as fixed costs grow . Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, industries which exhibit higher fixed costs should 
experience less problems with misrepresenta�ion of quality. This 
suggests that barriers to entry established by professional associations 
which take the form of large fixed costs such as training requirements 
or license fees may well act to insure product quality, even in the 
absence of effective quality monitoring by the association. The 
magnitude of the incentive created is easily determined from cost data 
and could therefore be empirically investigated. 
II THE DEPARTURE RATE AND ARRIVAL RATE 
Firms are assumed to be able to produce either high quality 
or low quality goods. Variables associated with high quality firms 
will be subscripted with an "h"; those associated with low quality 
firms will be subscripted with an "l". There are N identical 
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consumers, each consuming one unit of the good per period. Consumers 
can only identify the quality of the good they receive after purchasing 
it, and even then only probabilistically. After purchasing a high 
quality good, consumers mistakenly identify it as low quality with 
probability a; after purchasing a low quality good, consumers mistakenly 
identify it as high quality with probability a. Assume that a + B < 1. 
This means that the consumer is more likely to believe that a good is of 
hiih quality if it is of high quality, than if it is of low quality.1
Let yh be the random variable describing the observed quality
of a good for a consumer patronizing a high quality good. Let yl
be the similar random variable for a consumer patronizing a low quality 
firm. Let h denote observation of a high quality good and l denote 
observation of a low quality good. Then yh and yl can be written as
follows. {h, with probability 1 - a 
y = h l, with probability a (1){h, with probability B 
y = l l, with probability 1 - B (2)
Each consumer receives a new observation on the firm he is 
patronizing each period. This allows him to update his estimate 
of the probability that the firm he is patronizing is producing the 
high quality good. Let p� and p� be the random variables describing
the consumer's estimate of his firm's quality after patronizing it for 
t periods. At the end of the first period, the consumer's estimate 
depends only on that period's observation. Let the function g1
describe the consumer's estimation process. 
1 
Ph gl (y h)
1 pl= gl (yl)
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(3)
(4) 
Assume that the consumer estimates a higher probability that the firm 
is producing high quality goods if he observes a high quality good. 
Formally, assume that 
gl (h):?.:. gl (l). (5) 
For periods after the first period, hhe consumer updates his existing 
estimate. Let the set of functions {gt};=2 
describe this behavior
t 
Ph 
t 
pl 
. t-1 gt(.ph ,Yh) t = 2,3, • . •
t-1 gt (pl 'Yl) t 2,3, ...
(6 )  
(7) 
As for g1 assume that dbservations of high quality produce at least
as large estimates. Formally, for any p E [O,l] 
gt(p,h) � gt(p,l). (8) 
Also, assume that a higher last period estimate results in at least 
as high an estimate this period. Formally, for p,q E [O,l] and 
p > q, then 
gt(p,h) � gt(q,h)
and gt(p,l) � gt(q,l). 
(9 )  
(10)
The consumer chooses a time dependent reservation probability, 
q(t), such that he quits his current firm and finds a new supplier if
and only if his probability estimate at time t falls below q(t).
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Specific analysis of the nature of q(t) is not important for this 
paper. (See the previously cited work on repeated games for some 
related work.) When the consumer leaves his current firm, he searches 
among the firms, using any information he can find from consumers 
and other sources. This process will be modelled in section IV. 
The consumer then begins consumption and quality estimation with the 
new firm he selects. Let Bh and B� be the probabilities of the
consumer spending at least t periods with, respectively, a high and 
low quality firm. We can write 
Bth
Bt.e. 
t i Pr{i�l(ph 2'._ q(i))}
t . 
Pr{i�i(pl 2'._ q(i))}.
Now define the numbers Bh and Bl.
"' 
Bh = 1 + I t•l
Bth
B = 1 + � Bt.e. L D- . t•l .... 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
( 14) 
In the context of this rather general structure, we can now 
draw a conclusion that will be used in the remainder of the paper. It 
turns out that if a fixed number of new consumers, n, choose a given firm 
every period, then in the long run the firm's expected number of consumers 
is n/Bh or n/B.e_, depending on whether it produces high or low quality 
goods. That is, in the long run, on average l/Bh or l/B.e_ of the firm's
customers leave it every period. Let dh and dl denote these departure
rates. 
dh
dl
l/Bh
l/Bl
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(15) 
(16) 
Furthermore dh is at least as small as dl. That is, high quality
firms experience a lower departure rate than low quality firms. 
Proposition 1 summarizes this result. 
Proposition 1: 
( 1) If n new consumers arrive at a firm each period, in the long run 
(2) 
(3) 
the expected number of consumers is n/Bh or n/Bl' depending upon
whether the firm produces high or low quality goods. Therefore 
in the long run on average the fraction dh and dl, respectively,
of a high and low quality firm's customers leave it. 
dh � dl.
dh is non decreasing in (1 -
a). 
dl is non decreasing in (1 - 6) . 
Proof: 
See Appendix. D 
Firms of the same quality have already been modelled as 
possessing the same departure rate. It is natural to assume that 
firms of the same quality also have the same number of new customers 
arriving on average. The number of arrivals per high quality firm 
should not necessarily equal the number of arrivals per low quality 
firm, however. Consumers can obtain some information about potential 
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firms to patronize from other consumers or other sources of information 
such as government or consumer associations. Let Ah and Al be the
average number of consumers arriving at high and low quality firms, 
respectively. Let Gh and Gl be the number of high and low quality
firms. Then let a denote the ratio of arrivals, where a is in [l,oo]. 
Ah/Gh
a = Al/Gl
(17) 
If there were absolutely no information available, then a would be 1 .
Consumers would be equally likely to choose any firm. As information 
about firm quality becomes better, consumers become better able to 
differentiate between high and low quality firms, and a becomes larger . 
For the discussion in section VI, a will be assumed to be created by 
a particular process. For the purposes of the other sections it can be 
2 any constant. 
III EQUILIBRIUM FIRM SIZE 
Although many of the equilibrium quantities such as firm size 
are expected values, they will be spoken of as certain for ease of 
exposition. Firms reach a constant size when their number of arrivals 
equals their number of departures. This is defined as their equilibrium 
size. The conclusion of bhis section is that the higher number of 
arrivals and lower departure rate for high quality firms results in 
the equilibrium size of high quality firms being larger than the 
equilibrium size of low quality firms. 
Let Nh and Nl be the number of consumers in high and low
quality firms. Let Dh and Dl be the number of consumers departing from
high and low quality firms. Then by definition 
Dh dhNh.
Dl dlNl"
Finally, by (17)
A Ghh _ - a. Al
- Gl
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(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
The above three equations describe the structure of consumer flows 
in the system. Consumers leave high and low quality firms at the rates 
of dh and dl. The ratio of arrivals at high and low quality firms is
described by (20) . In equilibrium, since firm size is constant, 
arrivals equal departures. That is, our equilibrium conditions are 
Ah= Dh (21) 
and Al = Dl (22)
Substitute (18) and (19 )  into (20) by using the equilibrium conditions 
to yield 
Nh/Gh dl.-- �.a-
Nl/Gl � dh
(23) 
Let xh and xl denote the size of high and low quality firms and y denote
adl/dh. Then (23) is
xh 
xl = Y·
(24) 
The relative size of high and low quality firms depends on the 
parameter Y· How can y be interpreted? It becomes larger as the 
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relative number of arrivals begins to favor high quality firms (a 
goes up) or the relative departure rate favors high quality firms 
(dh goes down relative to dl . )  Therefore y is a composite measure of
the extent to which arrivals and departures reward high quality 
firms relative to low quality firms. The parameter y is always in 
[l,�]. When y equals 1 consumer arrivals and departures do not 
discriminate between high and low quality firms . As y grows larger, 
high quality firms begin to experience more arrivals and fewer departures 
than low quality firms. This results in a larger size for high quality 
firms relative to low quality firms. 
One final assumption is that all firms face a capacity 
constraint of k. Therefore in equilibrium 
xh k. (25 ) 
The single market price adjusts so that the high quality firms produce 
at capacity. Low quality firms masquerading as high quality firms 
necessarily produce at less than capacity given that they sell at the 
same price. An equilibrium in which all low quality firms charged 
a lower price and also produced at capacity would no longer involve 
misrepresentation of product quality, since consumers could use price 
to differentiate between I>roduct quality prior to purchase. Some firms 
may well choose to produce a lower quality product at a lower price . 
However, this amounts to the firm exiting the market for high quality 
goods and entering a different market . In this paper I study the 
sin,gle market for high quality goods and incentives for misrepresenta-
tion within it. The question of how markets for various qualities 
relate to one another and how relative prices equilibrate is a separate 
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problem. Understanding the behavior within each market is the first 
step towards dealing with this larger problem. 
IV FIRM ENTRY AND PRODUCT QUALITY CHOICE 
At the market price, p ,  every firm must decide whether to 
actually produce a high quality product, to produce a low quality 
product and misrepresent its quality, or to not produce at all. 
Assume that there is a total of I firms, indexed by i. 
i Let ch and 
c� be the constant marginal cost for firm i of producing , respectively, 
high and low quality units. Let F + Fi be the fixed c
ost of production 
for firm i . 3 
When firms compare the relative profitability of these three 
courses of action , they assume that any action on their par� will 
leave average firm size for high and low quality firms and other firm
s' 
behavior unaffected. It is also assumed that firms are concerned
 with 
maximizing their long run average profits. In other words , firms do
 
not discount future profits.
4 This assumption allows analysis of the 
long run incentives to misrepresent product quality as opposed to
 the 
incentives for "fly by night" operators. This latter problem ha
s been 
analyzed by others· (Klein and Leffler, 19 7 9 ) .  
The long run average profits t o  b e  accrued from produc
ing 
i 
the high quality good, Ilh, are 
i i ITh = pxh - chxh - F - Fi 
and from producing the low quality good are 
i 
Ill 
i 
pxl -
cl xl -
F - Fi . 
(26)  
(27) 
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The firm chooses the course of action associated with the largest of 
the two numbers IT� and rr1. By rearranging (26) and (27) , 
Rearrange to yield 
ni > h -
i 
i p - ch xl
II l <=> --_-i ;:: -;z-P - cl h
i i X C
i i 
IT
h 
� ITl 
<=> P � h h -
xlcl
xh - xl 
Let Pt be defined by
x i i p� = heh - xlcl
l. xh - xl
(28)  
(29)  
(30) 
In accord with Klein and Leffler (19 79 ) , call Pf the quality guaranteeing
price for firm i. At prices above Pf firm i produces high quality go�ds,
while at prices below Pf it produces low quality goods. As a convention,
assume the firm produces high quality goods when the market price is 
Pf as well. It is easy to see that Pf is greater than c� from (29)
so long as xh 
> xl.
The intuition behind this result is clear. Since fixed 
costs are the same for either mode of production, only variable costs 
are relevant in a comparison. If price equalled the variable cost 
of producing high quality, then there would be no advantage to 
generating more business by producing high quality goods. It would 
be more profitable to sell fewer goods, but make a profit on each, 
As price rises above c�, the advantage to generating more business 
by producing high quality goods becomes more substantial until finally 
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at some point it becomes large enough that producing high quality 
goods becomes the most profitable course of action. 
Note that there is no necessary relation between how high 
cost a firm is and whether it is more inclined towards producing high 
or low quality goods without further assumptions. Suppose that we 
can order the firms so that c� and c1 both increase in i. Even in 
this case Pf may not
.
increase in i. However, if we additionally
assume that c� increases in i more quickly than c1, then Pf increases
in i. In particular, this includes the case where c�/c1 is a constant. 
Therefore under a fairly plausible assumption, higher cost firms are 
more likely than lower cost firms to produce lower quality goods. 
Two points concerning the firms quality choice in long run 
equilibrium should be noted. First, in equilibrium xh/xl = y, so as y 
becomes larger, the quality guaranteeing price becomes smaller. 
Reputation affects firm size through two processes in this model. A 
firm producing high quality goods experiences a lower departure rate 
and a higher arrival rate. The number y is a measure of the combined 
strength of these two factors. As y becomes larger, reputation matters 
more and a firm is more likely to produce high quality products. 
Second, a "perfectly efficient" leave rate or arrival rate 
would solve the problem by itself. That is, if dh/dl was 0 or a was
* i 
�. then p would be 0 and all prices above ch would induce production
of high quality goods. Therefore the fact that consumers cannot 
determine the quality of a good prior to purchase does not in and of 
itself create a market with low quality goods if firms have sufficiently 
low discount rates for future business. Difficulty in determining 
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the quality of a good even after purchase adds an entirely new 
reason to expect production of low quality goods. A firm may have 
an incentive to produce low quality goods even in the presence of no 
discounting when such post-purchase observability problems exist . 
5 
Firm i therefore makes its production decision as follows . 
xh, xl and p are 
such that 
i i i ITh � ITl /\ ITh � 0 
i i i ITl > ITh /\ ITl � 0 
i i ITh < 0 /\ -IT l < 0 
Firm i' s decision 
Produce high quality 
Produce low quality 
Do not produce 
Therefore the number of high and low quality firms is determined 
as follows. Let Its denote the number of elements in the set S .  
Gh = lt{i : IT� � IT� /\ IT� � O} (31) 
Gl = lt{i : IT� > IT� A IT� � O} (32) 
G Gh + Gl (3
3) 
'V MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
Equations (23), (25), (31), and (32) together with the 
fact that there are N consumers, determine market equilibrium. For 
convenience, I rewrite them here. 
G h 
Gl
lf{i 
lt{i 
i 
Nh/Gh = y 
Nl/Gl
Nh/Gh k 
p - ch Nh/Gh --- > -- /\ 
i - N0 /Gl p - cl .._ 
. Nh (p - c�)G � F + Fi} h 
i P - ch -- . < 1 P - cl 
Nh/Gh /\ (p Nl/Gl 
Nh + Nl = N 
i Nl cl) G � F +Fi} l 
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(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38)
These five equations determine the five variables Nh , Nl' Gh' Gl and 
p .  I assume that a solution exists t o  the above . 
To derive comparative statics it is convenient to rewrite 
these five equations as follows: 
Nh - kGh = 0 
Nl - (k/Y)Gl = 0 
Nh'+ N.e: - N
Gh - fh(p ,F ,k ,y)
Gh - f,e{p , F , k ,y) 
where fh and fl are defined by
i 
0 
0 
0 
fh (p, F , k ,y) - lt{i 
p - ch 
> .!.---i - y p - c 
/\ (p - c1h
.
)k > F + F.}- 1 
and fl (p , F,k , y) lt{i 
l 
:£ P - ch 
< l /\ (p -- ---·i y p - c 
l 
i k Co)-> F + F }
...  y - i 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
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Since fh and fl only assume integer values they are not
differentiable. Therefore it is not strictly correct to apply the 
algorithm of  total differentiation to obtain comparative statics 
results . However, we can perform exactly the same algorithm for 
small discrete changes of the parameters . To avoid the extra notational 
complexity of this procedure, I will formally use differential 
not:ation and apply the total differentiation algorithm. However, 
strictly speaking some of the infinite differences should actually 
be interpreted as small discrete changes . 
Some properties of fh and fl are useful in deriving comparative
statics results . For reference, they are gathered together in 
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2:
(1) fh is non decreasing in {p ,y,k}
(2) fh is non increasing in {F}
(3) fl is non decreasing in {k}
(4) fh is non increasing in {F,y}
(5 ) (fh + fl) is non decreasing in {k,p}
(6) (fh + fl) is non increasing in {y, F}
Proof :  
Obvious. 0 
The comparative statics results are now stated in Proposition 3. 
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Proposition 3 :
(1) Effects of y : 
(i) Nh and Gh are non decreasing in y .
(ii) Nl is non increasing in y .
(iii) The effect of y on p and Gl is indeterminate .
(2) Effects of F: 
< 
Suppose that fl -P<_�)
Then 
flFfhp . 
fhF
(i) Nh and Gh are non decreasing (non increasing) in F .
(ii) Nl and Gl are non increasing (non decreasing) in F .
As well it is  always true that 
(iii) p is non decreasing in F .  
(3) Effects of k :  
(i) p is non increasing in k .  
(ii) The effects of k on Nh, Gh, Nl' and Gl are indeterminate.
(r) Effects of N: 
(i) Nh and Gh are non decreasing in N
(ii) The effect of N on Nl and Gl is indeterminate .
(iii) p is non decreasing in N .  
Proof :  
See Appendix. 0 
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Corollary 3-a: 
(i) Nh is non increasing in a and S.
Nl is non decreasing in a and a. 
(ii) Nh is non decreasing in a. 
Nl is non increasing in a. 
Proof : 
{i) This follows from Proposition 3 - (1) and Proposition 1 - (3) 
and the definition of y. 
(ii) This follows from Proposition 3 - (l) and the definition of y . 
D 
These comparative statics can be best understood by first 
recasting (34) - (38) in a more traditional "supply equals demand" 
framework. The demand is N and is fixed . Supply is the number of high 
quality firms , Gh' times the size of high quality firms , k, plus the
number of low quality firms , Gl' times the size of low quality firms ,
k/y. Long run equilibrium supply is thus kGh + (k/y)Gl. Market
equilibrium occurs when 
k N = kfh(p , F ,k,y) + Yfl(p ,F , k,y). (46) 
It is equation (46) that determines market price .  Then Gh' Gl' Nh
and N0 are determined by 
Nh = kfh(p,F ,k ,y) (47) 
k Nl =.y
fl(p ,F ,k,y ) (48) 
Gh = fh(p ,F ,k,y) (49) 
Gl = fl(p , F ,k ,y ) . (50) 
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Therefore, the effect of any parameter on price is determined solely 
by (46) .  The effect of any para�eter on the other variables , Nh , 
Nl, Gh' or Gl, is determined by two factors -- first ,  its effect on
price and price ' s  subsequent effect on the other variable and , second , 
the direct effect of the parameter on the variable through the 
appropriate equation of (47) - (50) . For example , we can write , 
based on ( 4 7) 
aNh afh a kafh 
�=�--ptt + �. (51 ) 
The effect of F on equilibrium price is ap/ClF as determined by (46 ) . 
Then k (Clf h/Clp) measures the effect of price on Nh. Finally , k(af h/ClF)
measures the direct effect of F on Nh.
Effects of y: 
The effect of an increase of y on supply is ambiguous. 
When y increases, fh increases and fl decreases . The total number of
firms , fh + fl, decreases, but because more of them are the larger
high quality firms , it is not clear whether kf h + (k/y) fl decreases
or increases . Therefore the effect of y on equilibrium price is also 
ambiguous . If y increases supply, it decreases price; if y decreases 
supply it increases price. 6
Now consider the effect of y on the other four variables . 
We can divide the effect ,  coneeptually, into two parts : the direct 
effect of y on the variable and the indirect effect through changes 
in the equilibrium value of price . First consider the direct effect 
assume that price is constant . Now consider the number of firms , Gh 
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and Gl . The fact that Y goes up means that the relative size of high
quality firms increases . Therefore every firm in the market finds it 
relatively more profitable to produce high quality goods and some firms 
which formerly produced low quality goods instead now produce high 
quality goods . Also , some firms which formerly found it profitable to 
be in the market as low quality producers now may find it unprofitable 
to be in the market at all . That is , when Y rises , the long run effect 
is to lower the size of low quality firms in absolute terms as well 
as relative to the size of high quality firms. Therefore some low 
quality firms may either begin producing high quality goods or leave 
the market entirely. 
Now consider the direct effect of y on Nh and Nl (i . e . ,
still assume that p is constant. )  Even if Gh and Gl remained constant,
an increase in y means that both relative arrival and departure rates 
favor high quality firms more and therefore the relative size of high 
quality firms increases . This means that Nh increases and Nl decreases .
The fact that Gh also goes up and Gl goes down amplifies this change .
But p changes as well, to satisfy the equilibrium condition 
that supply equal demand . It can be shown that the indirect effects 
do not overwhelm the direct effects for Nh' Gh and Nl; the effect
on Gl may be reversed. However, the equilibrium values of Nh and Nl
are probably of most interest since these are the number of high and 
low quality goods sold. Proposition 3 therefore states that when Y 
increases, the number of high quality units being sold increases and 
the number of  low quality units being sold decreases . Recall that Y 
is a measure of the extent to which reputation operates in the market .  
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Reputation includes two phenomena: the tendency for a higher quality 
firm to receive more repeat purchases and the tendency for a higher 
quality firm to receive more new arrivals through word-of-mounh 
advertising. Both operate to affect relative firm size and y measures 
their joint effect .  
From Corollary 3-a, improving the consumer ' s  ability to 
judge the quality of products and providing more information about the 
quality of all firms will, through t heir effect on y, increase Nh
and decrease Nl. To the extent that advertising improves consumers ' 
ability to judge and compare quality and to select new high quality 
firms, it should therefore result in a larger fraction of high quality 
products. 
Effects of F: 
The effect of an increase in the fixed costs of all firms 
on price is determinate .  An increase in fixed costs does not change 
the relative profitability of high and low quality production, but 
it does make production in general less profitable. Therefore , the 
long run supply decreases and equilibrium price increases . 
Now consider the effect of increasing F on the other four 
variables . The direct effect is to decrease all four, since firms 
of both types leave the industry . However, price then rises to bring 
supply back up to N and this also influences the four variables. 
The net effect on the number of each type of firm is therefore the 
sum of the effect from lowering F and then raising p so that total 
supply remains unchanged. 
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As price rises , all firms find production of high quality 
goods becoming more profitable relative to low quality goods . Therefore 
some existing firms in the market switch from production of low quality 
to high quality goods . However, because price rises there is an entry 
of firms producing both high and low quality goods . If this second 
factor is large enough, it is conceivable that as price goes up , the 
number of low quality firms as well as the number of high quality 
firms increases . 
Suppose, for a moment , that this is not the case -- that the 
number of low quality firms decreases when price rises. Then the net 
effect of F is easy to sign . Raising F directly causes both Gh and 
Gl to drop . Then the compensating price rise causes further drops in
Gl; however production returns to its original level and firm size is 
unchanged . Therefore Gh must have risen above its original level . 
In this case, an increase in fixed costs causes an increase in the 
number of high quality firms and a decrease in the number of low quality 
firms . Since F does not affect firm size, an increase in the number 
of consumers patronizing high quality firms and a decrease in the 
number of consumers patronizing low quality firms also results . 
Even if a price rise causes an increase in the number of 
low quality firms , the above result will still hold as long as an 
increase in price does not cause Gl to rise "too much. "  The initial 
increase in F causes both Gl and Gh to drop . The equilibrium adjustment 
of price upward then causes Gl and Gh to both rise. So long as the 
relative rise in Gl is exceeded by the relative rise in Gh, the result 
still holds . That is , when flp is positive we must have
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_k < _..h:E. I f I I f I fiF - fhF (52)  
for an increase in F to cause an increase in the equilibrium values of 
Gh and Nh and a decrease in the equilibrium values of Gl and Ni. 
This condition is fairly plausible . For example suppose 
that entry and exit into the industry occur by low quality firms . 
That is , high quality firms are also the low cost , high profit firms . 
Section IV discussed conditions under which this might occur. Then 
fhF = 0 but fhp is positive due to "switchovers" by existing firms
and the RHS of (52) is oo. However, the reverse results may hold if 
an industry is such that low profit firms tend to be high quality 
producers and price rises cause very few switchovers from low to high 
quality but do cause entry of low quality firms . 
This analysis suggests that industry organizations may well 
promote product quality even if they engage in little or ineffective 
quality monitoring . To the extent that they create large fixed 
costs for members by requiring training or license fees, production 
of high quality goods becomes more attractive to members . Furthermore , 
to the extent that the organization is able to act like a monopolist , 
it will restrict entry and raise prices , which once again creates an 
indirect incentive to produce high quality goods . This is not to 
suggest that anti-competitive trade associations are necessarily social 
benefactors . It may well be that the social costs of such anti­
competitive actions outweigh the benefits of improved product quality . 
This is an empirical issue . The magnitude of the incentive for firms 
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to produce high quality goods created by license fees or training 
costs for various industries is readily determinable from cost data . 
It would be interesting to determine if industry association requirements 
actually tend to substantially alter members' incentives or rather 
merely create opportunity for monopoly profits. 
Effects of k: 
Most effects of changing capacity are indeterminate. When 
capacity is increased , long run supply shifts out so equilibrium price 
drops .  
Effects of N: 
When the number of consumers increases , equilibrium price 
of course rises . The effect of N on the other four variables 
Nh , Nl, Gh , Gl -- is to tally through the effect of increasing price .
Therefore the number of high quality firms and the number of  consumers 
patronizing high quality firms increases .  The effect of price on the number 
of low quality firms is indeterminate for reasons previously discussed . 
VI CHOICE OF A RESERVATION PROBABILITY 
The consumer must decide how harsh a judge to be of his 
current firm when contemplating switching firms . The consumer would 
like to select some rule which tends to maximize his long run probability 
of patronizing a high quality firm. This goal is complicated by 
another factor -- search is costly. Therefore , the consumer might 
choose a rule involving less search than that which maximizes his 
2 7  
probability of patronizing a high quality firm in order to  save on 
search costs . 
A more specific assumption about the process of consumer 
search for new firms is introduced in this section. Assume that 
consumers receive incomplete information from their friends and 
associates about the firms they patronize. In particular , consumers 
receive a judgment that the firm is either high quality or low quality 
as opposed to a detailed description of the friend ' s  experience with 
a particular firm. A consumer can recommend either for or against 
his current firm when a fellow consumer makes an inquiry . He recom­
mends for it if he intends to patronize it again next period . He 
recommends against it if he intends to switch himself .  
This assumption probably becomes more reasonable when 
quality has many dimensions and is not easily summarized by any 
statistic . For example, the quality of a doctor involves a range of 
poorly measurable factors such as his diagnostic judgment, surgical 
competence, bedside manner ,  etc .  The quality of many professional 
services has a number of dimensions . It may well be that in such 
a case the most often coilllllunicated piece of information is simply 
whether the firm is "good" or "bad . "  
One other necessary condition for this assumption to be 
reasonable is that consumers be relatively homogeneous, or at least 
that consumers be able to easily classify other consumers as to whether 
their tastes are similar .  In the extreme case, we could imagine a 
case where quality consists of a number of different factors valued 
differently by different consumers . Firms are "stochastically 
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identical" -- the fact that one consumer prefers firm 1 to firm 2 gives 
us no information about any other consumer ' s  preferences . In this 
case,  a positive or negative quality recommendation provides no 
information at all . 8
The interest in analyzing this class of markets, as opposed 
to those where all available information is perfectly communicated , 
lies in the fact that an externality exists in the consumer ' s  choice 
of how harsh a judge to be .  When the consumer chooses a reservation 
probability he has an effect on those consumers who will use his 
judgment as a basis upon which to select a new firm. However, he 
does not take this into account when choosing a reservation probability . 
That is, there is an extra marginal benefit to choosing a higher 
reservation probability that the consumer ignores -- the benefit that 
other consumers receive from more reliable judgments . As a consequence 
the individually rational choice of a reservation probability is lower 
than the socially rational choice. 
To demonstrate the externality formally, assume that each 
consumer uses the following sort of rule for deciding when to leave 
a firm he patronizes . He chooses a reservation probability, q .9 
The consumer continues to patronize the same firm until his estimate 
of the probability that the firm is high quality drops below q. Then 
he seeks out a new firm, possibly asking friends for recommendations . 
Recommendations are merely positive or negative . No actual probability 
estimate is communicated . 
Consistent with the long run equilibrium orientation of this 
paper , we define an optimal reservation probability as the one which 
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maximizes the consumer ' s  long run average expected value . To define 
the socially and individually rational reservation probability some 
notation must be introduced. We will consider a particular consumer 
and label all variables associated with him with a "*"· Variables for 
the other consumers will be identical and denoted by the variable 
without a "*· " We will define a function W(q* , q) which yields the 
long run expected value to the particular consumer if he chooses q* 
and everyone else chooses q .  The particular consumer chooses an 
individually rational value of q*. Let Q (q) denote the particular 
consumer ' s  choice of q* given that everyone else chooses q .  Then 
Q(q) satisfies 
W(Q (q) , q) > max - 8 E (0,1] 
W(8 , q) · (53) 
However ,  the particular consumer was chosen arbitrarily and consumers 
are alike. Therefore , the value of q that consumers choose satisfies 
q = Q (q) . (54) 
The optimal level of q is the one such that the return to each consumer 
is maximized . That is , the optimal level of q satisfies 
W(q , q) >max W(8 , 8 ) .- 8 E (0 , 1] 
(55 )  
The purpose of this section is  to  show that values of q which satisfy 
(54) are different , and in general smaller than, values of q which 
satisfy (55 ) .
To do  this , W must be defined .  The departure rates for any 
consumer are a function of his choice of a reservation probability . 
Therefore we can write for some functions �h and �l: 
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dh � h (q) 
d.t � .t (q)
d� = �h (q*)
d! = �lq*) (56 )
A crucial realization for the purposes o f  this section is that the 
relative arrival rate for the particular consumer, a*, depends on dh 
and d
.t 
but� dh or dl. The consumer ' s  choice about which firm to
patronize next period , given that he has left his old firm, depends on 
what other consumers tell him about whether they intend to patronize 
their firms next period .  This latter fact depends on dh and d.t.
Therefore so does a* . By composition with (5 6 ) , a* is a function of 
q but � q*. Therefore we can write ·far some function, o, 
a* o(q) . (5 7) 
An example may make this point clearer: Suppose that the consumer 
considers a firm by asking one of its patrons for a recommendation and 
accepts a firm as soon as he receives a positive recommendation . 
Suppose , as well, that the consumer has an equal chance of considering 
any firm. Then a* is 1 - dh/l - d.t.
Costs of search for the consumer rise along with q* since 
a large reservation probability means the consumer will be departing 
from firms more often and thus searching more often. Let S (q*) 
be the consumer's search cos ts . . Let uh and u.t be, respectively, the
value of a high and low quality product to every consumer . The 
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consumer now knows everything necessary to calculate an optimal 
reservation probability , except the long run probabilities of his 
patronizing a high quality firlll or a low quality firm. Let h* and
.t* denote these quantities . 
Lemma 1: 
h* 
.l* 
Proof: 
See Appendix. 
idla*Gh 
d1a *G f; '+ d�G.t 
d� (l - Gh) 
d*a*G + d*G .t h h.t
(58) 
(59 )  
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From Section V, Gh and G.t are generally functions of y and
thus of q and q* . When Gh and G.t vary with the consumers ' choice of q
other externalities than the one identified at the start of this 
section could be identified based on the fact that the consumer does 
not consider the benefit that accrues to others when he generates a 
higher Gh through search . However, this is a more standard argument .
The externality originating because recommendations as opposed to 
obj ective quality information are communicated seems more novel and 
is thus the one I consider. To avoid confusing this argument with 
externalities involved with Gh and Gl, I assume Gh and Gl are
constant . 10 Therefore h* is a function of q and q* because d� and
di depend on q* through (56 )  and because a* depends on q through (5 7) . 
Therefore we can write for some function, 6,
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h* 6 (q*, q) . (60) 
Now W(q*, q) can be defined .  
W(q* , q) eCq*, q)uh + (1 - 6(q* , q) ) ul - S (q*) . (61) 
Assume that W(q* ,q )  is concave and differentiable in q* and that 
W(q,q)  is concave and differentiable in q .  We can now state the 
conclusion of this section. 
Proposition 4 :  
Let x satisfy (54) and y satisfy (55) . Then x # y so long 
as 02Cx, x) # 0. Furthermore ,  if 62 (q , q) 
> 0 for every q, then x < y.
Proof: 
See Appendix . D 
When the individual chooses a reservation probability, he 
does not consider the benefit he confers on others through providing 
recommendations . That is , he ignores 62 (q ,q) . Therefore so long as
this benefit is non zero, he will in general make the wrong choice . 
It might be most reasonable to expect the relative arrival rate, a, 
to always grow with q .  Then 62 is positive . This means that as
consumers become harsher critics of firm performance they become 
relatively better at differentiating high quality firms from low 
quality firms . If this is the case, then the socially rational 
reservation probability is larger than the individually rational 
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probability. When the individual chooses a reservation probability , 
he does not consider the benefit he confers on other s through 
providing recommendations , and thus chooses too low a level .  If  62 
exhibits perverse behavior and becomes negative at some point , then 
the consumer may well be ignoring a negative externality and 
consequently choose q* too high. In either case, an externality 
exists which precludes achievement of a decentralized social optimum. 
Of course this externality becomes smaller to the extent 
that consumers are able to communicate the actual estimated quality 
of their firm, as opposed to a positive or negative recommendation. 
This analysis therefore reinforces the policy recommendations of 
Wilde and Schwartz (19 79) , although for entirely different reasons . 
This suggests that the state should reduce the costs to 
consumers of comparing purchase alternatives . One way to 
achieve this is for the state to require more standardiza­
tion of the way in which firms quote prices and terms 
because such standardization would reduce the cost of 
comparison shopping. It also seems wise to remove barriers 
to private, voluntary standardization. Thus courts 
should not regard the use by a seller of a' standard form 
contract as a factor which militates against enforcement 
of the contract, for such judicial conduct raises the 
cost to firms of creating standardized forms . Also , 
legislatures should consider relaxing antitrust 
enforcement to permit more voluntary standardization 
of the ways in which prices and terms are quoted . 
Also , to the extent that advertising generally increases the sophistica-
tion and awareness of all consumers , it may facilitate transfer of 
information among consumers . 
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V CONCLUSION 
When consumers have difficulty in accurately evaluating 
the quality of a good or servic� firms may contemplate staying in 
the market over the long run even though they misrepresent quality. 
"Reputation" provides an incentive for firms to produce high quality 
items . Through differential quit and arrival rates , higher quality 
firms tend to have more customers .  The model seems to apply 
particularly well to professional services. Professional associations 
tend to severely limit information flow to the consumers they service . 
Three different factors suggest that this lowers the quality elasticity 
of demand and thus results in higher fractions of low quality firms 
and consumers patronizing them. One of the three factors depends on 
the observation that when transaction costs severely limit word-of-
mouth advertising an externality begins_ to be attached to the consumer ' s  
choice o f  whether o r  not to continue patronizing a firm. I believe 
this idea is new to the literature. 
The formal model in this paper resembles in some respect 
and was influenced by that of Schmalensee (1978) , in which he 
investigates the relationship between advertising and product quality. 
Product quality is fixed in this model and advertising is the choice 
variable of the firms . It is natural to ask if Schmalansee's results 
are robust to the case where firms may also choose product quality as in 
this paper' s  model . I am currently working on this extension. The other , 
more difficult, direction for research suggested by this paper concerns 
the relationship between price dispersion and product quality .  This 
paper assumes that a single market price exists . Presumably another 
reward for establishing a reputation might be the ability to charge 
a higher price . 
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APPENDIX 
Proposition 1: 
(1) Consider a high quality firm' s population of customers . There 
(2) 
are n customers who just arrived. 1 There are an average of Bhn
customers who have been with the firm one period before . In 
general there are an average of B�n customers who have been with
the firm t periods before . Therefore the firm ' s  total number 
of customers is 
[ r Btn) + n .  t=l h (A-1) 
Therefore the total number of consumers is nBit. If n customers 
arrive every period and the expected number of customers stays 
constant at nBh then the expected number of customers that leave 
each period is also n. That is , on average dh of the firm ' s  total 
customers leave each period. The case for a low quality firm 
is obviously similar .  
It  is  clearly sufficient to  show that B� � B1 for every t .
Choose any -t·--aoo fix it . Let rh and rl'- be. the random vector of  
t repetitions of ,  respectively, yh and Yi· 
rh = Cyh,yh' • · · ,yh) (A-2) 
rl = Cyl,yl, . . •  ,yl) (A-3) 
n h n t r Let� be { ,l} . Therefore� is the range of rh and l" Let 
c £ �t. We will write c = (c1 , c2 , . . .  ,ct ) .  Let ph and Pl be the
random vectors of the first t probability estimates . 
Ph 
1 t (Ph' . .  . ,Ph)
1 t pl = (Pl' . . .  ,Pl)
-�5 
(A-5) 
(A-6) 
Based on (3) , (4) , (6) , and (7) , recursively define the function 
G: !::.
t 
-l> [O , l ] t:
Pl = G (rh) (A-7) 
Pl = G (rl) (A-8) 
Because of the monotonicity assumption (5 ) ,  (8) , (9 ) , and (10) , 
it is clear that G is also monotone . That is if o and o* £ !::. and 
oi = h => o! = h then
G (o*) � G (o) . (A-9 ) 
(For two vectors x = (x , . . .  , x ) and y = (y , . . .  , y ) in R
n we. n • n 
say that x � y if xi� yi for every i = l ,  . . .  ,n . )
Now let q be any vector in [O, l]t; q is the vector of reservation
probabilities . 
q (q1
, q2·····qt )
We want to prove that 
Pr{G (fh) � q} � Pr{G ( rl) � q} .
To do this , construct a set of random vectors 
vector is a t-tuple 
� = c �, r� , ... , r!) 
where t {yh' j � ir j = yl' j > i.
{f}t .i= O 
(A-10) 
(A-11)  
Each random 
(A-12) 
(A-13) 
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By definition, r0 is rl and r
t is rh. Therefore , to prove (A-11)
it is sufficient to show that for i=O, . . . , t-1 
·+1 i Pr{G(r1 ) 2'._ q} 2'._ Pr{G( fr) 2'._ q} . (A-14 ) 
For notational convenience it is easiest to show this fact for i = 0. 
However,  it will be clear that the method of proof is perfectly 
general . Rewrite the random vectors G ( r1) and G (r0) as a discrete
combination of two random variables. 
1 (G(h,yl, . • .  , yl) ,  with probability (1 - a )G(r ) = � 
G (r0) 
lG(l,yl, . . .  , yl) ' with probability a. {G(h, yl, . . . , yl) ' with probability B 
G(l ,yl, . . .  , yl) ' with probability (1 - B) 
Now define the following subsets of t:.t-l.
H = {o £ !::. 
L = {o £ 1::. 
N = {o £ !::. 
t-1 
t-1 
t-1 
G(h, o) � q /\ GCl, o) :i q} 
G (h, o) � q "G(l, o) � q} 
G (h, o) 1. q /\ G<l, o) i. q} 
(A-15) 
(A-16)  
(A-17) 
It is clear from (A-9) that H, 1, and N are disjoint and their union 
is 6t-l . 
of Yr 
Finally, let r�-l denote the random vector of (t-1) -triple
t-1 rl = ,. (yl, yl, . . .  , yl) J (A-18) "' 
t - 1 times
Based on this notation, we can rewrite the LHS of (A-14 )  for i=O as 
t-1 t-1( 1  - a)Pr{rl £ H} + Pr{ rl £ L} . (A-19)  
dNh
dNl
dGh
dGl
dp 
We can rewrite the RHS of (A-14) for i = 0 as 
t-1 t-1 } (3Pr{r l £ H} + Pr{r l £ L • 
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(A-20) 
Because (3 .s_ 1 - a, (A-20) is less than or equal to (A-19) .  o 
Proposition 3 :  
Totally differentiate the system o f  equations (39) - (43) to 
yield 
1 0 
0 1 
1 1 
0 0 
0 0 
1 
-k 
0 
0 
1 
0 
k kfh:p + 1lp
0 
-k/y 
0 
0 
1 
h 
y lp 
-k -f y lp 
-f hp 
-f lP 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
-fhp
-flp
-�fhp
k;E 
�P,
-fhp 
-f lp 
-1 
dNh
dNl
dGh
dGl
dp 
kf l tP
�f 
y lp 
f hp 
f lp 
+l 
0 
0 
0 
f hF 
f.tF
k2 -f y lp 
-k2 -f 
y lp
k 
y-flP 
-kflp
-k 
Gh 
Gl/y
0 
fhk
flk
-k2 -f y hp
k2 � 
y hp 
-k -yfhp kfhp
k 
y 
0 
-kGl--2-y 
0 
fhy
fly
0 
0 
0 
fhF
f .tF
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Gh
Gl/y
0 
f hk 
f.ek
dF 
dk 
dy 
dN 
(A-21) 
0 
-kGl--
2
--
'f 
0 
fhy
fly
(A-22) 
0 I lclF 
0 I ldk 
1 1 ldy 
0 dN 
0 
Therefore we have 
dNh/dy 
dNl/dy
dGh/dy 
dGl/dy 
dp /dy 
dNh/dF
dNl/df
dGh/dF
dGl/dF
dp /dF 
dN/dk 
dN/dk 
dG
h/
dk
dG/dk 
dp /dk 
1 
k kf hp + -=yf.tp 
1 
k kfhp + Y:lp
1 
kf + � hP Y lP 
2 k2G f 
£.._{f f - f f } + .e 
hp 
y hy lp ly hp 2 y 
k2 k
2fh Gl
-{fh fl - f,e;
_fh } - p y y p y p y2
k - {fh f o - f o fh } +Y Y -<-P -<-Y P 
-k{fhy
flp - fly
fhp} +
-k{fhy + fl/Y} + 
k2 
y{fhFflp - flFfhp
}
-k2y{fhFflp - flFfhp}
kfh G _!'.!L1
y
2
kf o G � 
y2
kGl 
1 
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(A-23) 
k 
y-{fhFflp - f .tFf hp
} I (A-24) 
-k{fhFflp - flFfhp
}
-k{fhF + f.tF/y}
k k2 k k
2
flp {y;h + �hk
} - fhp{ycl + �lk
}
k k2 k k
2
-flp
{Y:ch + yfhk
} + fhp{ycl + �lk
}
Gl k k 
-fhp 
{Gh + y + Y:lk} + flp{ythk}
Gl 
-flp
{Gh + y + kfhk} + fhp {kflk}
Gl k 
-Gh - y - kf hk - 'Yf .tk
(A-25) 
40 
dNh/dN kfhp
dNl/dN 
� dGh/dN 1 
y lp 
= 
dGl/dN
kfh + � 
fhp I . (A-26) 
p y lp flp
dp/dN 1 
Now a number of terms need to be signed to prove the Proposition . 
I will list each term and its sign as a claim and then prove it . 
Claim 1 :
Proof: 
k kfh + ,0 p y <-P 
> 0 .
By Proposition 2 - (1) , fh > 0 .p -
By Proposition 2 - (5) fh + f 0  > 0 .p <-P -
As well ,  y � 1 .
Therefore 
k k k kfh + , 0 > , t.� + , 0 p Y <-P - Y •f.!' Y <-P 
k = -(f + f ) y hp lp 
> 0 .  
Claim 2 :  fh f 0. - f 0  fh > O.Y <-P <-Y P -
(A-27) 
0 
41 
Proof :  
By Proposition 2, fh > 0 and fh + f 0 > 0 .  Thereforep - p <-P -
either J fhp J � J flp J or flp � 0 is true .
By Proposition 2, f1,,.,, > 0 ,  f 0. < p ,  and fh + f 0. < 0 .  "I - <-Y - Y <-Y -
Therefore I f .e.y I � I f frv I • 
Suppose that J f hp J � I f  lp I · Then 
-> f f 
l fhp l � l f.e_p l } 
'
I f ly I � I f hy I 
I hp .ty I � I f .e./ hy I • 
Since -fh f 0. > 0 ,  Claim 2 is true . P <-Y -
Now suppose that f 0  > 0 .  � -
(A-28) 
Then
Claim 2 is clearly true because both terms in the sum are non negative . 
0 
Claim 3 :  fhFf lp - f .fFfhp � o .
Proof :  
The proof i s  similar t o  that of Claim 2 .  0 
Proposition 3 now follows directly . 0 
LeDDI1a 1 :
Let ht be the probability that the consumer patronizes a high
quality firm at time t .  The consumer ' s  probability o f  leaving a high 
quality firm is d'Ti· His probability of leaving a low quality firm is 
d!. Given that he leaves his current firm, his probability of arriving 
at a high quality firm is a*Gh/ (Gl + a*Gh) and at a low quality firm
is Gl/ (Gl + a*Gh) .  Therefore , we can write
h
t+l 
� d�a*Gh] ht �l - d�) + Gl + �*G� + (1 - ht) d!a*Gh Gl + a*Gh
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(A-29) 
This Markov process converges to h* .  The value for l* can be directly 
calculated in the same fashion or can simply be calculated by subtracting 
h* from 1 .  D 
Proposition 4 :  
The solution t o  (54) satisfies 
81 (x, x) (uh - ul) - S ' (x) 0 (A-30) 
The solution to (55) satisfies 
[ 81 (y ,y) + e2 (y , y) ] (uh - ul) - S ' (y) 0 . (A-31) 
These are different so long as e2 (x,x) � 0 .  By assumption the LHS
of (A-30) slopes down. Therefore if e2 (q , q) is positive for every q ,
the LHS of (55)  intersects the axis at a point to the right of x. 
D 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  As explained in the introduction, this mathematics can also be 
interpreted to model a situation where a firm attempting to 
produce high (low) quality goods does not have complete control 
over the process and thus sometimes produces low (high) quality 
goods . Then the assumption that a � S < 1 means that a firm 
attempting to produce high quality goods is more likely to produce 
high quality goods than is a firm attempting to produce low quality 
goods . 
2 .  It is being assumed that firm size does not affect relative 
arrival rates . Nelson (19 76) has correctly pointed out that 
larger firms might be better able to establish a reputation for 
a number of reasons . Such a modification should not substantially 
change the analysis . 
3 . Fixed costs are written as  F + Fi instead of merely as  Fi so  that
the parameter F can be varied for comparative statics .
4 . Schmalensee (1978) also uses this obj ective function to  derive
his comparative statics .
5 .  As a convention, the firm chooses to produce when the best production 
process yields zero profits and chooses to produce high quality when 
6 .  
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production of either high or low quality yields identical non 
negative profits . 
This result depends on the supply curve sloping upward in price . 
This is proven in the Appendix in the proof to Proposition 3 
under Claim 1 .
7 .  Recall the discussion surrounding equation (29) concluded that 
the profits from high quality production relative to low quality 
production rise as price rises . 
8 .  Satterthwaite (1979) considers such a model . Not surprisingly , 
he models information transfer as an exchange of facts about the 
specific aspects of a firm's  quality . Satterthwaite also allows 
parties to exchange secondhand information and to possess memories 
of previous exchanges . He can manage such an elaborate model 
because it is not necessary for him to consider explicitly the 
nature of the information transferred , only the amount . This is 
a fruitful area for further research . 
9 .  In previous sections q was allowed to depend on t .  A reading of 
Rubinstein (19 79)  suggests that the optimal reservation probability 
will vary with t .  For this section it  is  easier to  analyze the 
optimal choice of the consumer if the domain is the real line . 
Instead of simply assuming the reservation probability is constant 
over t ime, we could view the consumer as already having performed 
10 . 
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a partial optimization. Let q be associated with the best policy 
in the class of policies whose average is q .  
The simplifying assumption is not that consumers assume Gh and 
Gl to be constant when choosing a value of q .  It is reasonable 
for consumers to exhibit behavior of this sort . This is similar 
to the behavior of firms assttmed in Section III -- they assume 
their actions do not affect relative firm size . Both sets of 
behavior derive from the fact that individual agents are a very 
small part of the market and the assumption bf Nash behavior .  
The simplifying assumption being made in this section involves 
calculation of the optimal level of q .  There are actually two 
separate issues involved in determining whether consumers choose 
an optimal level of q .  One is whether the non-cooperative choice 
of q by a consumer adequately takes into account the benefit that 
he confers on all other consumers by changing Gh and Gl. The 
other is whether non-cooperative choice of q by a consumer 
adequately takes into account the benefit that he confers on all 
other consumers through the recommendations he gives to them. 
I isolate the second issue by assuming that Gh and Gl are constant 
when calculating an optimal level of q with which to compare the 
consumer ' s  choice. It seems intuitive that the first factor 
would reinforce the second -- the optimal level of q is higher 
and involves more search than the chosen level . However, I have 
formally only analyzed the second factor. 
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